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Abstract 
It is often implicitly assumed by researchers that their readers understand what cognitive map and 
cognitive mapping are, and their justification for study. This paper differs in this respect by explaining 
explicitly the 'what' and 'why' questions often asked, demonstrating cognitive mapping's multidisciplinary 
research worth. First, it examines questions concerning what cognitive maps are, the confusion inherent 
from the use of the term 'map', and the usage and reasons for alternative expressions. Second, it examines 
the theoretical pplications or conceptual research, concerning cognitive maps role in the influencing and 
explaining spatial behaviour; spatial choice and decision making; wayiinding and orientation; and the 
cognitive maps utility and role as a mnemonic and metaphorical devise; a shaper of world and local attitudes 
and perspectives; and for creating and coping with imaginary worlds. Third, it discusses cognitive mapping's 
practical and applied worth, concerning the planning of suitable living environments; advertising; crime 
solving; search and rescue, geographical educational issues, cartography and remote sensing; and in the 
designing and understanding computer interfaces and databases, especially Geographical Information 
Systems (GISs). 
Introduction 
This paper aims to discuss explicitly what 
cognitive maps are and their justification for 
study. It is intended as a broad overview of the 
subjects multidisciplinary nature and its current 
and potential applications, and to highlight the 
inherent definitional problems associated with 
such a wide range of users. Such a review is 
necessary to stimulate and encourage more 
collaboration between researchers from different 
backgrounds, reveal applications that individually 
we may have not been aware of, and to try and 
strengthen definitional problems, hopefully intro- 
ducing an element of conformity in term use, so 
far lacking because of a multidisciplinary esearch 
background. It is not intended as an in-depth 
review of specific applications, nor as a platform 
to discuss, critique or explain the many other 
issues, such as the many theories concerning 
learning, development, content, form, structure, 
thought, brain location and measurement of cog- 
nitive map knowledge. It deliberately contains 
many references to allow and promote cross- 
disciplinary reading. 
What are Cognitive Maps and Cognitive 
Mapping? 
The traditional definition used and accepted by 
many researchers states that: 
cognitive mapping is a process composed of a series 
of psychological transformations by which an indi- 
vidual acquires, stores, recalls, and decodes informa- 
tion about he relative locations and attributes of the 
phenomena in his everyday spatial environment 
(Downs & Stea, 1973a, p. 7) 
Cognitive mapping can thus be thought of as a 
marriage between spatial and environmental cogni- 
tion, where spatial cognition is defined as: 
...the knowledge and internal or cognitive represen- 
tation of the structure, entities, and relations of 
space; in other words, the internalized reflection and 
reconstruction f space in thought (Hart & Moore, 
1973, p. 248) 
and environmental cognition refers to: 
the awareness, impressions, information, images, 
and beliefs that people have about environments...it 
implies not only that individuals and groups have in- 
formation and images about the existence of these 
environments and of their constituent elements, but 
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also that they have impressions about heir charac- 
ter, function, dynamics, and structural interrelated- 
ness, and that they imbue them with meaning, 
significance, and mythical-symbolic properties 
(Moore & Golledge, 1976, p. xii). 
In this way cognitive mapping refers to a 'place 
cognition' as described by Hart and Conn (1991), so 
that rather than dealing exclusively with either the 
spatial aspect or the environmental spect of how 
we think about everyday environmental nd geo- 
graphical data, it combines the relevant sections of 
the two so that: 
...one is brought closer to meaning and action, for 
"place" is the focus of human intentions. Conse- 
quently, the study of place leads us to the simultane- 
ous investigation of thinking, feeling, and acting in 
the environment (i alics added) (Hart &Conn, 1991, 
p. 278) 
Cohen (1985, p. 9) sums such a 'place cognition' as: 
A union of spatial knowledge, social knowledge, and 
an understanding of the physical and social nature 
of environments--all in relation to...cognitive ~hnc. 
tioning. 
Tolman (1948) first used the term 'cognitive map', 
to describe how rats, and by analogy, humans 
behaved in the environment. He hypothesized that 
we construct a map-like representation within the 
'black box' of the nervous system which is used to 
guide our everyday movements. This representation 
is actually structured in the same way as a carto- 
graphic map, gaining euclidean properties with 
repeated experience. The term gained little recogni- 
tion until it was resurrected by experimental nd 
development psychologists in the early 1970s, and 
although used with extreme caution for a time 
owing to behaviourist connotations (Allen 1985), 
the phrase eventually took hold, especially among 
geographers to whom the term had appeal (Downs 
& Stea, 1973a, Boyle & Robinson, 1978). 
At its most general, a cognitive map is a mental 
construct which we use to understand and know the 
environment (Kaplan, 1973a). The term assumes 
that people store information about their environ- 
ment which they then use to make spatial decisions. 
Tversky (1992, p. 134) suggests that at its broadest 
definition a cognitive map is the: 
cognitive apparatus that underlies...behaviour. 
while Stea and Blaut (1973, p. 227) describe it as a 
construct which enables a person: 
to predict he environment which is too large to be 
perceived at once, and to establish a matrix of envi- 
ronmental experience into which a new experience 
can be integrated. 
In effect, a cognitive map is a mental devise and 
store which helps to simplify, code and order the 
endlessly complex world of human interaction with 
the environment (Walmsley, et al., 1990). Downs 
and Stea (1973a) refer to them as 'convenient short- 
hand symbols that we all subscribe to, recognise 
and employ'. This subscription does not have to be 
performed consciously, but can be if necessary. It is 
in effect a mental representation f spatial/environ- 
mental knowledge (N.B. the term representation is 
not meant o imply image). 
This construct is thought o exist because it is 
assumed that people store information about their 
environment which they then use to make spatial 
decisions which guide behaviour, and is, in effect 
responsible for geographical 'survival' knowledge. 
(Stea 1969; Kaplan 1973b). Kaplan (1973b) 
similarly hypothesizes that cognitive maps develop 
as a means of quick and efficient mechanism for 
handling information thus giving man a selective 
advantage in a difficult and dangerous world. They 
~re in effect 'evolutionary adaptive' giving man a 
'~ense of place' necessary for survival (Stea, 1976). 
Downing (1992, p. 442) in a discussion of images 
wrote a passage which neatly describes cognitive 
maps. Cognitive maps: 
suspend impressions, thoughts, feelings and ideas 
until, for some reason, consciously or unconsciously, 
the mind solicits, changes, and often distorts or ma- 
nipulates its contents for some immediate purpose. 
In this way cognitive maps (images) allow us to 
bridge time, by using past experiences tounderstand 
present and future situations. 
Cognitive maps, though, are not just a set of 
spatial mental structures denoting relative position, 
they contain attributive values and meanings. As 
Wood and Beck (1989) explain, the cognitive map is 
not independent of meaning, of role, of function, of 
need, of end, and of purpose. This distinction leads 
to the conclusion that a cognitive map includes 
knowledge about places as well as knowledge con- 
sisting of spatial relationships (Kaplan, 1976) and 
that cognitive maps involve the integration of 
'images, information and attitudes about an 
environment' (Spencer & Blades, 1986 p. 240). They 
are in effect 'representations of objects and their 
associations' involving generic and motivational 
information (Kaplan, 1973b). As Spencer et al. 
(1989, p.108) state: 
. . .  cognitive maps are not isolated and contextless 
entities: they are formed uring purposive activity in 
the everyday world of the child, and, in as much as 
they encode the resources, valued friends, memories, 
and aspirations as well as factual information about 
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geographical l yout and routes, they should perhaps 
better be described as cognitive/affective maps. 
Golledge and Timmermans (1990) have reported 
that cognitive maps are in effect a series of know- 
ledge structures which consist of different levels of 
detail and integration. These knowledge structures 
develop with age and education, thus increasing the 
information held. By combining different knowledge 
structures and information using cognitive pro- 
cesses relating to perception, storage, retrieval and 
reorganization that interact with memory struc- 
tures a cognitive map is formed for specific tasks 
(Golledge t al., 1985). This, if interpreted literally 
means there is no one cognitive map in memory but 
rather we construct them for specific events (Siegel 
& Cousins, 1985). In this respect cognitive maps are 
dynamic. 
It must also be recognized that cognitive maps 
are not independent of time and space and that 
'since each environment exists in a time-space con- 
text, so too will cognitions of those environments' 
(Moore & Golledge, 1976 p. 11). In summary then, 
and for the purpose of this paper, cognitive maps 
constructed from the knowledge store contain 
information concerning, spatial relations and 
environmental ttributive data which reside within 
a Space-time context allowing the possessor to 
operate within an environment and to process 
environmental and geographical data. They are 
'complex, highly selective, abstract and generalised' 
structures which are 'incomplete, distorted, schema- 
tised, and augmented' (Downs & Stea, 1973c, p.18) 
Problematic definitions and the confusion created 
using the term 'map' 
Buttenfield (1986, p. 238) has reported that the cog- 
nitive map is not in fact the internal representation 
of the environment but rather the external product 
of measurement. 
Kuipers (1978) has called 'common-sense know- 
ledge' a cognitive map and again this is not strictly 
true. Kuipers (1978, p. 129) defines common-sense 
knowledge as: 
knowledge about the physical environment that is 
acquired or used, generally without concentrated 
effort, to find and follow routes from one place to 
another, and to store and use the relative positions of 
places. 
This implies the ability to make inferences and 
propositions, both of which are not necessarily 
needed to be able to complete a cognitive mapping 
exercise, but rather exercises needing the use of 
configurational knowledge (knowledge of the associ- 
ations between, and relative locations of places). 
Although there is a general acceptance as to what 
cognitive mapping refers to, there still remains 
much misunderstanding  the use of the word 'map' 
i~ the term 'cognitive map', and thus the form of 
cognitive maps. The form of cognitive maps (images, 
conceptual-propositional, dual coding, holograms, 
genetic coding) are not investigated within this 
paper, but there are four main viewpoints that can 
be adopted in explaining the use of the term 'map' 
which has caused confusion and misuse in the past 
(see the debate between Graham 1976, 1981 and 
Downs 1981): 
(1) Is it the case that the cognitive map is a carto- 
graphic map (Explicit statement)? 
(2) Is it the case that the cognitive map is like a 
cartographic map? (Analogy) 
(3) Is it the case that a cognitive map is used as if 
it were a cartographic map (Metaphor)? 
(4) Is it the case that the cognitive map has no 
real connections with what we understand tobe a map, 
i.e. a cartographic map, and is neither an explicit 
statement, analogy or a metaphor but rather an un- 
fortunate choice of phrase: 'a convenient fiction?' 
(Siegel, 1981). In  effect just a hypothetical construct. 
Because it reflects an internal, spatial memory, the 
external reported information reflects a cognitive 
process, and so is called a cognitive map. 
Gatrell (1983) has noted this confusion as to 
whether a cognitive map is an inferred internal rep- 
resentation or an elicited external representation. 
Buttenfield's position is not advocated here: a cogni- 
tive map refers to the internal thinking of the every- 
day spatial environment. The external form of this 
thought, elicited through an appropriate methodo- 
logy, is called a spatial product, a term initially used 
by Liben (1981) which has gained some standard 
recognition. 
Explicit Statement: A cognitive Map is a map. 
O' Keefe and Nadel (1978) have hypothesized that 
the hippocampus, a part of the brain associated 
with long-term memory, is a cognitive map, and 
that this map is a three-dimensional, euclidean 
model of the world, with rigid geometrical properties. 
This belief is based on findings of several experiments 
which found the activity of the rats hippocampal 
neurons correlated with the rats location in the 
maze. Other neuroscientists such as Lieblich and 
Arbib (1982) have agreed that the hippocampus 
does play a role in wayfinding but are not so sure 
of its role as a store of the whole 'world graph' 
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(cognitive map), but rather argue that it holds a 
'chart of the local neighbourhood that must be 
presumably read from a whole atlas stored in long- 
term memory' and is effectively a situation recog- 
niser' (Lieblich & Arbib, 1982 p. 640). Few, though, 
have drawn the same conclusion that neurons 
within the brain act as a three-dimensional model of 
the world. The main argument suggesting otherwise 
focuses upon scale change, that is, every neuron is an 
individual and so to cover all experiences the cognitive 
map would have to be huge. Second, there is no allow- 
ance for an update of new data, which would effec- 
tively mean a rebuilding of each neurons identity. 
Analogy: A Cognitive Map is like a map. Alterna- 
tively, an implicit argument for cognitive maps having 
map-like properties are the same results which dis- 
cover euclidean spatial relationships within the spatial 
products. If the spatial products we obtain in experi- 
ments are euclidean or can be considered to be 
euclidean after task strategy error is removed, 
surely it is implied that the spatial relation 
knowledge held within the mind is also euclidean 
in nature. Kaplan (1973a, pp. 275-276) initially 
hypothesized this viewpoint: 
It further assumes that this information is coded in a 
structure which people carry around in their heads, 
and this structure corresponds, at least, to a reason- 
able degree, to the environment it represents. 
He continues to state that 'this map is far from 
a cartographer's map, however. It is schematic, 
sketchy, incomplete, distorted, and otherwise sim- 
plified and idiosyncratic' (Kaplan, 1973a, p. 276). 
In effect, the analogy is that the 'map in the head' 
inspected by the 'mind's eye' is functionally identical 
to a graphical map inspected by the physical eye 
(Kuipers, 1982). That is, cognitive map information 
is isomorphic to information held in a graphical 
map, so that information added to, and retrieved 
from, the cognitive map is similar or the same as 
operations used to add or retrieve information from 
a graphical map (Kuipers, 1982). Although this does 
not mean that there must be a region in the brain 
onto which the environment is physically mapped 
(Stea, 1969; Kuipers 1982), but rather that there 
will be a correspondence b tween input-output be- 
haviours of the storage and retrieval functions of the 
two representations (Kuipers, 1983). Statements such 
as 'Every person acquainted with an environment 
possesses a simplified cognitive structure of the 
environment' (Goodchild, 1974, p. 157); '...integrating 
information.., to form an overall representation 
something like a survey map' (Newcombe, 1982, p. 74) 
and '...that give the cognitive map its maplike 
properties' (Garling et al., 1985, p. 147) do though 
imply a representation with map-like qualities. 
Downs and Stea (1973c, p. 11) used the term 'map' 
to denote a functional analogue. 'The focus of atten- 
tion is on a cognitive representation which has the 
functions of the familiar cartographic map but not 
necessarily the physical properties of such a pictorial 
graphic model' and consequently argue it is an 
analogy to be used, not believed. One of the problems 
encountered by readers are these deceptive and 
misleading qualities of the analogy (Downs & Stea, 
1973c). 
Metaphor: A Cognitive Map works as if it were a 
map. The reason for believing that the cognitive 
map is a metaphor is the belief that we act as if we 
possess a map in our minds (Kaplan, 1973a; Graham, 
1976). If being used as a metaphor, the cognitive 
map should be interpreted, 'it was like he had a 
map in his head': 
The problem is, it is easy to slip into the belief that a 
map is something that people have stored away 
somewhere inthe head (Downs, 1976, p. 68). 
As Spencer et al. (1989, p. 108) state: 
The metaphor of a map in the head is so persuasive 
that we are tempted to believe that there is no 
metaphor, but rather that our questioning ofthe sub- 
ject is the search for the dimensions ofa real 'thing'. 
This though does not mean that we do in fact 
possess uch a map, and assuming we do, removes 
the metaphors heuristic value (Tuan, 1975). What 
makes the spatial metaphor 'map' so useful is that it: 
makes the relationships explicit and because it 
provides the necessary guidance for using imagery to 
remember abstract conceptual relationships that are 
not easily imaged (West et al., 1985, p. 22). 
The main argument against such a cognitive map 
construct is the non-euclidean properties discovered 
by some methods of investigating our knowledge 
structures, and the fact that we have incomplete 
knowledge not integrated into one single 'map' but 
rather disconnected components (Kuipers, 1983). 
Hypothetical Construct: a convenient fiction. Cog- 
nitive maps described as hypothetical constructs 
render the word 'map' redundant. In this context 
'map' has no literal meaning and although the term 
could be misinterpreted to imply that a cognitive 
map is a map, or is like a map, or works like a map, 
the implication is not intended: 
As hypothetical constructs, cognitive maps have an 
allegedly real status; they refer to hypothesised 
underlying entities or processes that there is reason 
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to believe do exist, which are inprinciple observable .... 
Thus, as a hypothetical construct, he term cognitive 
map and its approximate synonyms refer to covert, 
non-observed processes and organisations of ele- 
ments of knowledge (Moore & Golledge, 1976, p. 8). 
The reasoning behind such arguments are spatial 
products with non-euclidean atures, such as in- 
travisity (A is estimated greater than B, B is esti- 
mated greater than C, C is estimated greater than 
A, where A, B and C are interpoint distances) or 
non-communicavity (distance from A to B, is not 
equal to the distance from B to A i.e. asymmetry), 
and leads to arguments of 'impossible figures' or 
'spaces' (Tversky, 1981; Baird et al., 1982). Whether 
these hypothetical internal entities' (Newcombe, 1985, 
p. 277) are like, or work like, a map is immaterial; 
the term map is used just to represent a set of 
processes which are believed to exist and affect our 
everyday spatial behaviour. As Siegel and Cousins 
(1985, p. 349) state: 
...cognitive maps are hypostatizations--abstractions 
that we create and use in understanding the sequence 
and development of the continual activity of cognitive 
mapping. In this sense, cognitive maps are a con- 
venient fiction. 
The position adopted for this paper and explained 
earlier, is that cognitive maps are hypothetical con- 
structs. 
Alternative expressions. This confusion concern- 
ing the meaning and context of the term has also led 
to the use of surrogate terms. These terms while 
being defined and used in some papers in a slightly 
different context o a cognitive map, have been used 
in others, instead of, or to imply 'cognitive map'. 
This is not aided by the fact that several authors are 
using the terms interchangeably across articles and 
in some cases within articles. Possible surrogates 
include abstract maps (Hernandez, 1991), cognitive 
configurations (Golledge, 1977), cognitive images 
(Lloyd, 1982), cognitive representations (Downs 
& Stea, 1973b) cognitive schemata (Lee, 1968), 
cognitive space (Montello, 1989), cognitive systems 
(Canter, 1977), conceptual representations (Stea, 
1969), configurational representations (Kirasic, 
1991), environmental images (Lynch, 1960), mental 
images (Pocock, 1973), mental maps (Gould & 
White, 1974) mental representations (Gale, 1982), 
orientating schemata (Neisser, 1976), place 
schemata (Axia et al., 1991), spatial representations 
(Allen et al., 1978), spatial schemata (Lee, 1968), 
topological representations (Shemyakin, 1962), 
topological schemata (Griffin, 1948), and world 
graphs (Lieblich & Arbib, 1982). 
Why Are There Variations in Definit ions 
Cognitive mapping's varying defmitions are basically 
the result of its multidisciplinary nature. Cognitive 
mapping has no one strong subject base and is es- 
sentially a research topic with inputs from most of 
the social sciences. Papers and books can be found 
from geographers, planners and architects, psychol- 
ogists, sociologists, anthropologists, political scien- 
tists, cognitive scientists and neurologists. This has 
advantages, giving the subject a wide base of knowl- 
edge and viewpoints, but does tend to mean that 
there is no strong united philosophical nd theoreti- 
cal base. This position has led to a variety of stand- 
points that currently exist. The movement towards 
integration (Garling & Evans 1991; Garling & 
Golledge, 1993) should help to alleviate the situation. 
One additional problem noted by Allen (1985) is 
the fact that the term 'cognitive map' has become 
an all-purpose, unrestricted entity describing all 
behaviour and thought concerning the spatial 
environment. The term has no practical constraints 
or boundaries. As a result he (Allen, 1985) calls for 
the use of more rigorous constructs from the study 
of cognition. The position advocated here is that 
the term should be used in this utilitarian way 
to represent he knowledge of, and interactions 
with, the everyday environment, and geographical 
information gained through other secondary sources 
such as maps, and that a new set of terms such as 
Liben's (1981) 'spatial thought', 'spatial storage', 
and 'spatial product' should be used to represent 
specific oncepts. 
Theoretical Worth: Conceptual Research 
General: influences and explains behaviour 
In the early 1960s, the behavioral approach in 
geography evolved as an answer to positivism 
(Golledge, 1981), as researchers began to realize 
that to exist in, and comprehend the environment, 
we formed cognitive maps from the mass of 'to 
whom it may concern' messages emanating from the 
world in which we live (Golledge & Stimson, 1987). 
The belief was that we could increase the explana- 
tory powers and the understanding of geographers 
by incorporating behavioural variables, along with 
others, within a decision making framework that 
sought to comprehend and find reasons for overt 
spatial behaviour rather than describing the spatial 
manifestations of behaviour itself (Golledge, 1981). 
In effect it was an: 
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attempt o base the explanation of human spatial 
activities on a foundation of human behavioral 
processes (Golledge, 1985, p. 113); 
to define models of man that were alternatives to 
the classic models of normative conomic rationality 
used in the past (Pocock, 1972) using data collected 
at the individual/micro-scale rather than using 
large scale governmental data (Golledge, 1985), and 
analysed using a series of: 
methods and models tied to non-normal statistical 
populations, non-parametric data, non-linear distri- 
bution activities, with an interest in multidimen- 
sional spaces, as well as physical spaces (Golledge, 
1985, p. 113). 
Thus the black box of man (an unknown constant 
in the study of environment/behaviour relation- 
ship) is replaced by a white box, in which the 
variable nature of man is recognized as being of 
fundamental importance (Downs, 1970). As Couclelis 
(1986) explains we have become interested in 
'answers to questions uch as "how do people really 
behave" or "how do people really make decisions".' 
The general belief is that cognitive mapping 
explains and leads not only to the understanding of
spatial behaviour, but the cognitive map is a mental 
construct (be it explicit, analogical, metaphorical or 
hypothetical) that actually influences behaviour, 
and by examining a whole range of spatial products 
(external representation of our cognitive map 
knowledge) we can understand spatial decision 
making and subsequent behaviour. Lynch (1976, p. 
xiii) explains that: 
People's behaviour in large-scale nvironments can 
be explained more completely through recourse to 
internal, subjective factors than by more traditional 
external, "objective" factors, and that behaviour 
is mediated by the image (cognitive map) of the 
environment. 
A sentiment shared by MacEachren (1992, p. 245): 
The knowledge of space (cognitive maps) is critical 
to attitudes toward, decision making about and 
behaviour within places 
and strongly advocated by Downs and Stea (1973c, 
p.10): 
We are postulating the cognitive map as the basis 
for deciding upon and implementing any strategy 
of spatial behaviour .... We view cognitive mapping 
as basic component of human adaptation, and the 
cognitive map as a requisite both for human survival 
and for everyday environmental behaviour. 
It is argued that we all have daily navigation 
decisions to make involving choice processes, for 
example, migration, shopping or recreation, which 
it is hypothesized are influenced by our ability to 
understand the everyday environment, i.e. cognitive 
maps (Golledge et al., 1976). As Baird et al. (1979, 
p. 92) point out: 
The ability to plan and execute movement in a famil- 
iar environment seems to require that one possess a
cognitive map [representation] of that environment 
in addition to the stimulus information directly 
available to the sensory systems. 
This has led Cadwallader (1976, p. 316) to suggest 
that the cognitive maps affect at least three types of 
decisions: 
(1) The decision to stay or go. 
(2) The decision of where to go. 
(3) The decision of which route to take. 
Garling et al. (1985, p. 143) add one more decision to 
this list: 
(4) The decision of how to get there. 
One of a cognitive map's functions then is to re- 
hearse spatial behaviour in the mind so that when 
we are actually travelling, we can act with a degree 
of assurance that we would otherwise not have 
(Tuan, 1975). They are in effect advanced organizers 
that influence the impact of later direct experience 
of the environment (Liben, 1991). 
The arguments concerning cognitive maps and 
spatial behaviour are circular though, and although 
'our knowledge of the external world impinges upon 
our actions...our acts affect our knowledge' (Webber 
et al., 1975, p. 100). This suggests that our cognitive 
maps are not stable entities, but are dynamic: con- 
stantly changing and evolving. We are constantly 
learning and altering the information we use to 
make spatial decisions. 'Behaviour modifies and is 
modified by interaction with the spatial environ- 
ment' (Matthews, 1980, p. 178). 
Boyle and Robinson (1979) have expressed oubts 
as to what a cognitive map is, and define it as a 
figural image with a cartographic form, in a sense 
an analogy. Upon this basis they argue that 
cognitive maps have a use in explaining human 
behaviour but conclude that 'cognitive maps play 
only a minor and intermittent role in effective 
thinking and that it is misleading to impute to them 
any great significance in the co-ordination of our 
spatial activities' (Boyle & Robinson, 1979, p. 64). 
A more effective argument against the utility of 
cognitive maps in explaining spatial behaviour has 
been argued by Piaget & Inhelder (1956) who state 
that behaviour in space and representation of space 
are in fact very different and they make the distinc- 
tion between 'practical' space (the capacity to act in 
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space) and 'conceptual' space (the capacity to 
represent space. The capacity to act and move 
intelligently through space may well occur before, 
and possibly in the absence of, the capacity to 
represent that space (Spencer et al., 1989). This 
argument is accepted, but it is argued that the 
subject still possesses cognitive map knowledge, 
which they find difficult o represent externally. 
Research concerning spatial behaviour within the 
environment can be divided into three main strands 
of spatial problem solving: spatial decision making 
(whether, why and where questions), wayfinding 
(how questions) and development of acquisition and 
learning (what and when questions). 
Spatial problem solving: spatial choice and spatial 
decision making 
It is hypothesized that the cognitive map provides 
information ecessary for spatial decision making 
and to execute the consequent behaviour (Briggs, 
1973). The cognitive map as discussed, therefore 
plays a role in four vital questions: whether to go 
somewhere; why go there; where it is that is the 
destination; and how to get there. Researchers have 
investigated these questions from the perspective of
cognitive mapping in relation to a series of applica- 
tion areas: consumer behaviour (Coshall, 1985a,b); 
residential and business location (Pacione, 1978, 
1982); movement patterns within an urban area 
(Johnston, 1972; Briggs, 1973) and recreational nd 
leisure destinations (Golledge & Timmermans, 1990). 
These all have real world applications, concerning 
planning, teaching and advertising. These are dis- 
cussed later, but the general argument is that if we 
can understand where people want to go and why, 
then planners both governmental nd commercial 
can plan for their needs. Another application could 
be advertising. For example, it is now noticeable 
within the marketing of business parks the use of 
centrality and ease of access as factors that sell. If 
you can alter peoples cognition of distance you could 
attract more custom. Studies that have looked at 
cognitive mapping in relation to spatial decision 
making though, tend to only take theory and inves- 
tigate its worth, without then re-contributing to
theory making. 
Spatial problem solving :wayfinding and spatial 
orientation 
Wayfinding is the ability to learn and remember a 
route through the environment (Blades, 1991) with 
the overall goal being able to relocate from one place 
to another in large-scale space (Gluck, 1991). Spatial 
orientation refers to the process by which a person 
knows where he or she is relative to something else 
(Garling & Golledge, 1989). These both use high 
level cognitive processes and are different from 
kinaesthetic senses of orientation and wayfinding 
which are low level reflexes for maintaining equilib- 
rium (Gluck, 1991). 
Gluck (1991) has divided up wayfinding research 
into two main categories: Competence and Perfor- 
mance literature. Both can be split into two further 
categories. The competence literature subdivided 
into computational models and information process- 
ing models, both of which can be interpreted as 
acquisition and learning models. These are often 
still implicitly or explicitly based in the theoretical 
frameworks of environmental cognition. The perfor- 
mance literature can be divided between general 
studies (applicable across all groups) and specific 
studies (children, elderly, special needs). 
Computational models of wayfinding are the 
result of the continuing expansion of artificial 
intelligence to research in the social sciences. There 
are two main model types: cognitively based and 
biologically (connectivist) based. The cognitively 
based models are centred around memory struc- 
tures and information processing and the biologi- 
cally based around the behaviour of neurons and 
are often referred to as parallel distributive process 
models (PDP) (Golledge & Timmermans, 1990). A 
further distinction in artificial intelligence is made 
between 'scruffies' and 'neats' (Zimring & Gross, 
1991). The 'scruffies' primary focus is on producing 
a computational model where the outcomes mimic 
human behaviour and in general are searching for 
direct links between the environment and be- 
haviour. 'Neats' are interested in reproducing 
human outcomes, but adopt cognitive science 
approaches that attempt o model people's mental 
processes accurately as well (Zimring & Gross, 
1991). It is generally the case that biological models 
are scruffy, whereas cognitive models are neat. 
Most popular among social scientists are cog- 
nitively based models. These models attempt o 
simulate human mental processes with computer 
programs (Kuipers, 1982) with the belief that an 
'individuals permanent knowledge structure pro- 
vides the basis for interpreting objects, actions and 
events in the external environment' (Smith et al., 
1982, p. 307). In general, they attempt to simulate a
wayfinder that learns the paths and landmarks in a 
large-scale space, and then can navigate through 
the space it knows, solving route-planning tasks. 
Models are often distinguished in terms of how the 
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environment is represented, and to the extent 
to which the knowledge is seen as procedural, topo- 
logical, or metric (Golledge 1992). The aim is to 
determine the types of knowledge that exist, the 
manner in which such knowledge is represented 
and organized, the mechanisms by which it is acti- 
vated, and the elementary and higher level cognitive 
processes that operate upon the knowledge base to 
produce new knowledge, inferences, evaluations 
and external behaviours' (Smith et al., 1982, p. 307). 
In other words to discover how we store, think 
about and carry out wayfinding activities. It is 
though not intended to replace theory but add to its 
development (Garling & Golledge, 1989). 
Example cognitive programs include, TOUR 
(Kuipers, 1978); TRAVELLER (Leiser & Zilbershatz, 
1989) ELMER (McCalla et al., 1982); SPAM 
(McDermott & Davis, 1983); MERCATOR (Davis, 
1983); CRITTER (Kuipers, 1985); NX Robot 
(Kuipers & Levitt, 1988); and Qualnav (Levitt 
et al., 1987, 1988). NAVIGATOR (Gopal et al., 1989) 
combines elements from spatial cognition and 
neurologically based information processing. Appli- 
cation studies includes G011edge t al. (1985) on 
wayfinding of children in a suburban area, an 
Couclelis's (1986) navigation i  an airport. 
Information Processing models are the second 
category proposed by Gluck (1991) These are effec- 
tively non-computational process models of how and 
why we acquire and learn the everyday environ- 
ment, including routes for wayfinding. Much of 
the work in this area has been carried out by the 
Environmental Psychology Research Group at the 
University of Umea, Sweden (Garling et al., 1981, 
1985, 1986; Saisa et al., 1986) concerning the use of 
travel plans to link cognitive map information pro- 
cessing with actual behaviour. These travel plans 
are in essence action plans, and are predetermined 
courses of action to reach a desire destination with 
the minimum investment ofeffort. 
The Performance Literature is concerned with the 
actual collecting and assessment of data rather than 
the building of acquisition and learning theories. It 
focuses on problems of measurement, discussing 
how to collect distance, direction or locational esti- 
mates to assess the route knowledge individuals 
possess for wayfinding. The aims of this research is
to find factors that affect the cognitive map, thus 
route knowledge and hence wayfinding, and then 
to integrate the results into existing theory. The 
number of factors are huge, ranging from personal 
characteristics, traits, meaning and ability; per- 
ceptual context; environmental influences to social 
influences. 
This is often looked at the general scale where 
results are considered applicable to all types of sub- 
groups of people. Some studies though concentrate 
at the more specific level concerning the wayfinding 
and orientation of specific subgroups of the popula- 
tion such as children (see work by Blades & 
Spencer), the elderly (see work by Ohta; Kirasic) and 
those with special needs be it mental or physical 
(see work by Spencer & Blades; Golledge et al., 
1979, 1983). 
Spatial problem solving: acquisition and learning 
The previous section dealt with wayfinding and 
discussed two types of investigation that looked at 
the acquisition and developmen t of wayfinding and 
orientating skills. This section discusses cognitive 
map development asa whole, and why this research 
is important at a academic, intellectual level and 
the implications for both theoretical and applied 
research. 
Research in this area has been traditionally been 
dominated by psychologists particularly those of 
developmental persuasion (Spencer & Blades, 1985), 
and can be split into three competing philosophical 
traditions which attempt o explain the develop- 
ment of cognitive mapping (Matthews 1992). These 
can be neatly represented by three questions 
(Table 1). 
From a purely academic standpoint the study of 
development and acquisition is vital to our under- 
standing of how a cognitive map is composed, con- 
structed and organized, and when changes occur in 
the development of this knowledge (Hazen et al., 
1978). Such studies are 'admirable because they 
portray an unfolding process' (Lynch, 1976, p. v) 
and essentially form the 'basic cornerstone in the 
understanding of mature forms of understanding an
experience' (Moore, 1976, p. 138). The implications 
of this research are therefore fundamental in the 
development of models of spatial behaviour and in 
practical applications such a teaching and planning 
TABLE 1 
Philosophical traditions of development research 
1 Is cognitive mapping ability given innately, and closely 
aligned to language acquisition (nativism)? 
2 Is cognitive mapping ability built up empirically from 
sensations derived from experiences of different geo- 
graphical environments (empiricism)? 
3 Is cognitive mapping ability constructed out of some 
sort of interaction between inherited and experiential 
factors (constructivism)? 
Source: Matthews (1992, p. 69). 
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because it reveals what knowledge people know and 
when this knowledge can be expected to develop. 
Mnemonic and metaphorical devise 
Tuan (1975) suggests that one of the functions of a 
cognitive map is as a mnemonic devise. They are 
important because if 'we wish to memorize vents, 
people, and things, it helps to know their locations 
or even assign them arbitrary locations' (Tuan, 1975, 
p. 210). Cognitive maps are therefore a means to 
structure and store knowledge (Saarinen et al., 
1988). Gilmartin (1985) has suggested that the visu- 
alization component ( he images we can form on the 
'mind's eye') has been used for thousands of years to 
enhance the learning and recall of information and 
Bellazza (1983, p. 830) describes uch visualization 
as the 'oldest known mnemonic devise'. West et al. 
(1985) explain that this involves imagining to-be 
remembered items in locations in a familiar environ- 
ment, and then remembering the items by taking a 
'mental' walk through that environment. Spatial 
thinking is often used as a metaphor for non-spatial 
tasks, where people performing non-spatial tasks 
involving memory, imagery and inference use spatial 
knowledge to aid processing the task (Downs, 1985). 
Local / world attitudes and perspectives 
The cognitive map as explained earlier extends be- 
yond knowledge of spatial relations to contain social 
and environmental meaning knowledge. This infor- 
mation is used to shape our attitudes towards, and 
perspectives of, the world, and hence our behaviour 
patterns at the local and national level. This, 
Golledge & Timmermans (1990) hypothesize mani- 
fests itself in everything from public reactions to 
events, to individual decision making as reflected in 
tourism and investment. These attitudes are more 
than just 'ignorance surfaces' as discussed by Gould 
(1983) but rather models on which people make 
everyday decisions. Obviously studies which reveal 
how we think about 'places' can give us insights into 
how 'we' are cognized and how we cognize other 
areas, and clues as to how to change our 'image' to 
create a more favourable one. As pointed out by 
Saarinen (1973, p. 148): 
It seems important in a world continually upset by 
international conflicts to try and gain an under- 
standing of variations in world views. 
The underlying belief is that when current world 
'images' are understood, education can be designed 
to remedy any weaknesses revealed, thereby provid- 
ing a basis for improved international understand- 
ing (Walmsley et al., 1990). Saarinen and his assis- 
tant MacCabe have been investigating the world 
'images' of students (3863) from all over the world 
(49 countries) as part of a large scale study (see 
Saarinen, 1988; Saarinen et al., 1988, 1992) Studies 
of cognitive mapping reveal how we do think about 
places, and certain studies show the connection 
between attitudes and planning, such as Gould 
(1969), Banerjee & Lynch (1977) and Lynch (1977). 
Creating and coping with imaginary worlds 
Tuan (1975) has hypothesized that cognitive maps 
also act as imaginary worlds. They depict attractive 
goals that tempt people out of their habitual rounds. 
We can as human beings construct mental descrip- 
tions of places we have never been to, from text such 
as a novel or word of mouth, such as a friend's 
description of a holiday area. What we essentially 
do is fit them into our schema of similar events we 
have experienced either first hand or secondhand 
through the media. In this way our cognitive map 
schemata llow us to create and cope with unknown 
place information. This may have practical rele- 
vance to studies of our attitudes towards places 
as discussed above, or to historical geography in 
explaining why people migrated to certain destina- 
tions (Tuan, 1975). 
Appl ied Worth: Instrumental  Research 
Understanding cognitive maps for geographers and 
urban planners 
General. The general implicit belief, especially 
amongst geographers (Aitken, Downs, Golledge, 
Gold, Humphreys, Pocock, MacEachren) and plan- 
ners (Appleyard, Lynch, Moore, Okabe) is that: 
knowledge gained about perceptual-cognitive pro- 
cesses may improve the quality of human environ- 
ments through policy, planning, and design, to the 
extent hat it tells us how to plan and design envi- 
ronments that do not interfere with the proper func- 
tioning of these processes (Garling & Golledge, 1989, 
p. 2O3). 
Lynch (1976, p. xi) clarifies this by stating: 
...[we] can better plan, design and manage the envi- 
ronment for and with people if we know how they 
image the world. 
In effect, there is increasing evidence that environ- 
ment and behaviour are interdependent (Lee, 1968), 
so that environments can influence behaviour, and 
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explanations of behaviour can be used to influence 
the make-up of environments. Indeed Golledge and 
Timmermans (1990, p. 76) report that: 
specific applications of the models and knowledge 
gained from investigations ofcognitive mapping and 
the acquisition of spatial knowledge are occurring 
with increasing frequency in environmental design, 
architecture and planning. 
The challenge then-is to provide both information 
about how people experience the physical environ- 
ment, and the sorts of human needs that the physi- 
cal environment must satisfy, to planners relatively 
starved of detailed behavioural data, so that there is 
adequate planning in the built environment hat 
reflects the behavioral propensity of residents and 
other users (Kaplan, 1973a; Aitken et al., 1989). 
This has resulted due to pressure on public decision- 
makers to provide structures and facilities which 
are useful and acceptable to their intended users 
(Lowery, 1973). By studying the spatial products of 
the cognitive map, such data will hopefully become 
available, rather than designers relying on intuition, 
rule-of-thumb and details from past work, to decide 
on what places of the future will look like (Kaplan, 
1973a, Downing, 1992). 
If cognitive mapping can be used to improve en- 
vironmental design then this should be explored. 
Canter (1977) has preliminarily examined the idea 
of encorporating cognitive mapping into design, but 
there has been little conceptualization f guidelines 
or policy. A fact of which Siedel (1985) is critical. 
The implication of this are discussed later. 
Examples of where policy has been suggested 
include Golledge et al.'s (1979, 1983) investigation 
of policy guidelines needed to allow the mentally 
retarded a full and active use of their local environ- 
ments. Carpmen et al. (1985) explored the effects of 
hospital design upon wayfinding, and found that 
poor design caused increased environmental stress 
to staff, patients and visitors. They suggest that 
this could be avoided through the introduction of a 
policy of clear maps, directories, you-are-here maps 
at key decision points, as well as trained staff able 
to give clear and concise directions. 
Passini (1992) has also examined wayfinding and 
the role of planners and designers in environmental 
design. He presents a guideline design method, which 
conceptualizes wayfinding as a spatial-problem 
solving process. There are seven steps, the first four 
area analytical, and the last three are aimed at 
stimulating reflection to arrive at a design solu- 
tion. 
Seelig and Seelig (1986) have noted that it must 
be made clear that other types of knowledge must 
TABLE 2 
Reasons for planning for children 
1 Children and adults differ in behaviour patterns, with 
play and education having a major role for children. 
2 Their land uses and facilities differ; or, where shared, 
are often used for different purposes. 
3 Daily ranging patterns differ, in ways that reflect 
adult's greater autonomy and access to resources. 
4 Children face different (and possibly greater) threats 
from their environment. 
5 Children are entirely outside the politico-economic 
decision-making process that determines land-use; 
adults have a greater chance of participating 
6 Children and adults differ in their interpretation of 
plans. 
Source: Spencer et al. (1989, p. 223). 
be included in the design process (including cogni- 
tive mapping knowledge) beyond analytical, objec- 
tive knowledge. As Goldberg (1983, p. 24) states: 
subjective and value laden intuitive knowledge merit 
equal credibility as sources of planning know-how. 
Experientially rooted synthetic knowledge is an 
essential complement to the deductive analytical 
information base of the present. 
Children's environments. Can research concern- 
ing cognitive mapping provide us with information 
concerning the environmental needs of children? 
The previous ection suggests that they can. If they 
can, why should we want to plan environments for 
children? (Hill and Michelson (1981) have offered 
some reasons (Table 2). 
These points mean that children and adults 
cognize and use the environment in different ways 
for different means. If how children cognize the 
environment affects their behaviour, activity patterns 
and interaction environment, research into how 
children do cognize the environment could be valu- 
able to both sociologists and architectural planners, 
with a view to creating environments more suited 
to children's needs, and may go someway to help 
alleviate the growing youth social problem. One 
study that has tried to do this was an international 
project sponsored by UNESCO, and carried out in 
Mexico, Poland, Australia and Argentina (Lynch 
1977). This research focused on low-income, low- 
resource areas of cities, and was intended to suggest 
public policy for neighbourhood improvement. 
Elderly environments. The elderly have been 
studied by a small number of researchers (Ohta, 
1983; Ohta & Kirasic, 1983; Regnier, 1983 Kirasic, 
1985, 1989, 1991; Kirasic et al., 1992) interested 
in how the elderly learn new environments. It is 
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hypothesized that age-related ecrements in the 
ability to learn and wayfind in an environment 
could have a impact on the quality of life for elderly 
adults (Gold & Goodey, 1987; Kirasic et al., 1992). 
As Kirasic states (1985, p. 185): 
It is ...imperative that we understand the nature of 
any spatial cognitive changes that occur with the in- 
creasing of age because any age related decline in 
spatial abilities should have a clear and significant 
impact on the elderly's individual's transactions with 
his or her spatial environment. 
A possible solution to this would be to discover 
the type of environments the elderly map cogui- 
tively, and hence can learn most quickly. These 
'optimum' environments may be more suitable as a 
living area, and as such should be useful to plan- 
ners creating places used predominantly by elderly 
people, such as residential homes and hospitals (Axia 
et al., 1991). They should not, however, disregard 
environmental features that appeal to the elderly's 
environmental assessment, but should contain a 
mix of easy to remember and pleasing features. It is 
also important hat they contain features of practi- 
cal importance, such as needed resources (shops 
and services) (Regnier, 1983). 
Environments for special needs people (both physi- 
cally and mentally handicapped). People with spe- 
cial needs often come to know the environment in 
different ways to the fully-abled. For some, interac- 
tion may be hampered ue to some type of physical 
or mental handicaps, meaning fewer and less- 
active participation with their surroundings. Others 
might suffer from less interaction due to impaired 
perceptual development or loss--most commonly 
blindness (Spencer et al., 1989). The need for re- 
search into how these section of society form and 
use cognitive maps is vital to the planner and edu- 
cationalist if we are going to be able to maximize 
their interaction and enjoyment of everyday envi- 
ronments. 
Fears are based around the notion that an im- 
mobile child will become an immobile adult, suffering 
dependency problems which could lead to psycho- 
social and adjustment problems (Spencer et al., 1989). 
The aim is to improve the life style of these groups to 
the point where they can 'travel safely, comfortably, 
gracefully and independently' (Foulke, 1983). For 
this to be realized individuals have to possess basic 
cognitive maps, that is they have to know where they 
are, where their goal is, and how to get between them. 
This requires that motor, perceptual and representa- 
tional skills are attained by the traveller (Spencer et 
al., 1989) and cognitive map knowledge built. 
The arguments run circular so that, we need suit- 
able environments for special needs groups to oper- 
ate in, and cognitive mapping research tells us 
whether such environments exist and point clues as 
to how to improve them. Golledge t al. (1979, 1983) 
have studied the cognitive maps of mentally re- 
tarded subjects with the aim of understanding how 
they cognize the environment they operate, so that 
guidelines could be provided for enhancing the envi- 
ronmental behaviour competence, and to discover 
which elements of the environment facilitated and 
impeded their use. Such information has dual pur- 
poses of enhancing education and providing details 
to planners. 
Understanding cognitive maps for education and 
computer interfaces 
Geographical education: general. Children's cog- 
nitive mapping research as been and continues to 
be studied for the purpose of improving education 
(Catling, 1979; Matthews, 1980, 1992). There are 
two hypotheses. First, it is believed that the spatial 
products reveal clues as to the level of geographical 
development of individuals, and provide us with 
information which we can use to improve education, 
increasing the range of spatial stimuli and elicit 
more suitable techniques of teaching (Hart & 
Moore, 1973). Second, that cognitive mapping 
exercise could be used as a means of enhancing 
the child's personal geography and as such is a way 
of enriching the teaching of geography, especially 
at the personal evel (Catling, 1978a,b, 1979). The 
approach advocated is that children examine their 
own and their peer's cognitive maps to learn about 
their experiences with the environment, with the 
aim of increasing awareness of places, details, and 
patterns in the neighbourhood (Spencer et al., 1989) 
and to introduce a number of aspects of map 
work and geographical and environmental studies 
(Catling 1978b). Such thoughts have provoked a 
number of researchers to argue for environmental 
education becoming central to the contemporary 
curriculum (Goodey & Gold, 1985; Matthews, 1986). 
As Hart & Moore (1973, p. 283) point out: 
Geographic education has only recently begun to 
take note of the crucial importance of considering 
the development of the child's conception of space. 
Beyond the confines of a classroom and academic 
learning, Brewster and Blades (1989) have found 
that both children and adults can be taught how to 
improve their cognitive maps, and to operate in an 
enviro nment more efficiently, thus leading to 
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greater environmental wareness and ability. A 
reason for study noted by Pocock (1980). This 
finding has yet to be carried into the classroom, 
where the lack of studies mean that evaluation of 
the impact of such teaching make it difficult to 
assess. Do children performing such exercises gain 
a better environmental wareness, greater graphi- 
cacy and locational skills to those that are not? 
(Spencer et al., 1989). 
Geographical education: concern for gender differ- 
ences. Another area of concern focuses upon gender 
abilities of boys and girls to perform to the same 
level at geographical problem solving tasks. Saarinen 
et al. (1988) have noted that females consistently 
performed below males on the NCGE Geographic 
Competency Test and in their sketch map 
experiments. Other researchers have noted similar 
such differences (Kail et al., 1980; Jahoda, 1979; 
Moore, 1979; Brown & Broadway, 1981; Spencer & 
Weetman, 1981; Gilmartin, 1984; Matthews, 1986; 
Brewster & Blades, 1989; Downs & Liben, 1991) but 
others have found none or expressed reservations 
and unhappiness with the findings (Feldman & 
Acredolo, 1979; Liben & Golbeck, 1980; Gilmartin & 
Patton, 1984; Webley & Whalley, 1986; Allen, 1988; 
Garling, 1989; Blades, 1990; Self et al., 1992). The 
reasons for this are a contentious i sue and a 
large debate is currently in progress centring 
around the spatial ability literature (for possible 
reasons ee Table 3). 
Obviously if such differences actually exist, we 
need to determine the reasons, so that we have the 
opportunity to alter our curriculum to readdress the 
balance. As noted earlier cognitive mapping and 
spatial ability influence other subjects beyond 
geography and the ability to navigate within the 
environment both of which are important issues. 
If the reason is due to social roles and stereotypes 
TABLE 3 
Possible reasons for differences between male and female 
spatial products 
1 Males and females having different ways of approaching 
the same problem, using different cognitive strategies. 
2 Performance and behaviour indicators favouring boys. 
3 Males and females possess different cognitive maps 
and information. 
4 Males and females are taught differently, and attend- 
ing different courses. 
5 Females positively react o stereotypes. 
6 Females have different social role constraints limiting 
their opportunities for environmental experience. 
7 Males and females have biological differences affecting 
the ability to understand and perform the task. 
research can be used to provide evidence for this 
social justice issue. 
Geographical education: cartography and remote 
sensing. It is believed that cognitive mapping 
(Thorndyke, 1981; MacEachren, 1991) and associated 
spatial abilities (Self et al., 1992) could have an 
effect on more technical aspects of geography 
including cartography, remote sensing and GIS 
(discussed next section). There are two ways to 
approach the problem, which are interrelated. First, 
you can try and discover how we cognize and use 
cartographic maps with a view to improving spatio- 
visualization skills and general understanding and 
comprehension of spatial relations. The second 
method is by improving cartographic based material 
to make learning easier (see next section). Both in- 
volve the use of cognitive mapping skills. 
Research concerning how we cognize and use 
cartographic maps with a view to improving spatio- 
visual and geographical understanding focuses 
around two central research themes. The first is 
concerns how we literally perceive the map and in- 
tegrate this knowledge into the cognitive map, with 
the aim of teaching these skills more effectively. 
Much of this work focuses around improving map 
reading and interpretation skills, and spatial ability 
(Thorndyke & Statz, 1979; Gilmartin & Patton, 
1984). 
The second concerns how we use other geographical 
knowledge in understanding the map. As Golledge 
et al. (1992) notes one of the unanswered questions 
is how do we convert travel experiences upon which 
we base much of our understanding of space and 
spatial properties into comprehension f simple spa- 
tial processes such as nearest neighbour, distance 
decay, regionalization and others fundamental for 
comprehending maps and diagrams and interpret- 
ing them for use in human activity (Golledge t al., 
1992)? Such research is necessary if we are to im- 
prove cartographic based education and open up 
such areas to naive users. 
I do not know of any research that specifically in- 
vestigates the utility of remote sensing to improving 
geographical education although a few investigators 
have looked at effect of gathering spatial products 
through aerial photography recognition Stea & 
Blaut, 1973; Matthews, 1984). 
Improving cartography and remote sensing. By 
investigating ways in which we currently integrate 
map information into the cognitive map, and how 
this information is subsequently used in navigation 
and to interpret other maps it is hoped we can learn 
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how to improve cognitive map ability and the maps. 
As Lloyd (1989, p. 109) points out: 
Cartographers hoping to provide better maps for 
people to read should understand the cognitive 
processes used to read maps. 
Researchers such as Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth 
(1982), and MacEachren (1991) have argued that 
there needs to be an interface between human 
perception and cognition and the graphic character- 
istics of a map. Thorndyke (1981) has suggested 
that how we judge distances can be affected by our 
use of maps and that clutter on maps leads to over- 
estimation of distances. He suggests that We should 
consider presenting geographical displays that 
supply requested information but minimize the 
amount of attendant, irrelevant data (Thorndyke 
1981). By understanding which elements of maps 
distort our cognitive maps it is hoped we can 
improve the map, in this case by removing un- 
necessary clutter. There are other factors which 
influence the cognitive map such as the map projec- 
tion used (Gilmartin & Lloyd, 1991). The solution to 
this is to produce maps applicable to specific needs 
0nly, maybe a role of GIS in the future. MacEachren 
(1991, p. 161) sums up neatly by stating: 
Considering how people learn about space and how 
they deal with the spatial aspects of their environ- 
ment on a daily basis will allow us to devise maps, 
and map presentation strategies, that facilitate 
thinking and problem solving rather than memorising. 
The same argument could be used to improve 
remote sensing, a situation noted by Edwards 
(1991). He has discussed how the cognitive map 
may be a vital base upon which our inferences 
concerning remote sensing data are based. In such 
cases we convert the images into two-dimensional 
base maps, by utilizing our perceptual systems in 
conjunction with our cognitive maps to identifying 
regions with similar spectral and textual properties, 
the relationships between these regions and 
neighbours, and knowledge about the physical 
connections between scene elements (Edwards 1991). 
If we understand how we cognize such images (most 
of which are false-colour composites) we could try to 
improve them to increase user understanding. 
Improving computer interfaces and databases 
focusing upon GIS. GISs and cognitive maps share 
similar purposes. GISs being systems designed to 
process data concerning the everyday geographical 
• environment, and cognitive mapping concerning 
how we think, store, produce and utilize such data. 
Both contain data concerning spatial relationships 
TABLE 4 
Applications of cognitive maps to GIS 
1 Cognitive map information could be used to supply 
designers with knowledge that could improve system's 
interface, and thus make them easier to use. 
2 Cognitive map information concerning how we store 
and think about geographical data could be useful in 
improving database design and efficiency. 
3 Cognitive map information could be used to improve 
education, specifically to increase understanding of the 
images displayed (discussed in the previous ection). 
and attributive data assigned to specific places in a 
space-time framework. Work though into the possi- 
ble connections has been confined to the application 
of spatial cognition to GIS, and a handful of investi- 
gations utilizing GIS for behavioural studies. Con- 
centrating on the application of cognitive maps to 
GIS it hypothesized that cognitive maps could be 
of importance in three main ways (see Table 4). 
GIS suffers from two basic interface problems 
that cognitive mapping research could be useful in 
rectifying: unfriendliness reducing potential benefits 
and misinterpretation leading to misuse. These 
problems need to be addressed if GIS is to succeed. 
Medyckyj-Scott et al. (1990) have noted that the 
increased sophistication of GIS has not always been 
accompanied by an improvement in usability, 
because GIS makes considerable demands on its 
users. The enlarged functionality makes the GIS in- 
creasingly complex and daunting, especially if inter- 
faced in a non-intuitive way, and leads to focusing 
upon a small number of specific tasks reducing the 
exploitation of potential benefits (Medyckyj-Scott & 
Blades, 1992). The utility of the GIS is being under- 
mined. As Mark and Gould (1991, p. 1428) state: 
When the user sits at a workstation and uses a GIS, 
he or she should be thinking about real-world phe- 
nomena, and not about computers or peripherals, 
commands or syntax, layers or pixels. 
The second problem of misuse through misinter- 
pretation often stems from the first. Where efforts 
have been made to improve usability, the ease of 
use, coupled with a lack of appreciation of the com- 
plexities of spatial data, has led to the employment 
of the wrong data types, at the wrong scale/resolu- 
tion, and in the wrong context o produce erroneous 
results and conclusions (Medyckyj-Scott & Blades, 
1992). 
There are two ways to tackle this problem. The 
first expects the user to adapt to the system by 
learning about space in the systems terms, acquiring 
a set of data structure-based concepts and the 
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accompanying vocabulary (Gould, 1991). The second 
involves the GIS design to be centred upon how 
people think and utilize everyday geographical space, 
i.e. based upon people's cognitive map knowledge. A
view adopted by Mark (1989, p. 551) who asserts: 
Optimal GIS interfaces will be based on the same 
cognitive maps [image-schemata] that are used when 
the person involved interacts directly with the real- 
world phenomena represented in the GIS. 
The first method of learning is impractical both in 
terms of time and resources. As such it is rejected, 
and the second approach of adaptation is advocated. 
In this approach adaptive interfaces are proposed, 
that operate at a level suitable to the user. Ideally 
(but probably not practically for a number of years) 
they should not only be 'user-friendly' but 'user- 
intimate', changing its approach to suit the particular 
operator's current needs (Turk, 1990). There are 
three prototype systems based upon this idea of 
adaptation: HyperArc; CUBRICON and ArcView. 
The first two work on the principle of trying to con- 
nect the package to the users view of the problem, 
and the third on the idea of reduced functionality, in 
effect creating a non-expert GIS. 
Cognitive maps may also aid the use of interfaces 
by allowing them to become more easily remem- 
bered. This is because how we interface the GIS can 
be thought of as an analogy to wayfinding, and in 
the same way we use cognitive maps to facilitate 
movement in the environment we can build up and 
use conceptual models of the how to manoeuvre 
within the GIS. Just as when we are not familiar 
with a region we stick to safe, known routes, the 
user will do so with the GIS, and as such fail to 
explore the system (Turk, 1990; Medyckyj-Scott &
Blades, 1992). In essence we form cognitive maps of 
the system, where certain screens are linked to 
meaning and the understanding of actions. In this 
way cognitive maps act as mnemonic devices as dis- 
cussed by Tuan (1975). If these cognitive maps can 
be improved so will user efficiency. 
An understanding of cognitive maps may also 
improve database design and efficency. The brain 
is probably the most efficient user of data known 
to man, and an implicit argument based upon 
such a statement is that, if we can start to under- 
stand its structure and contents we can produce 
more efficient databases, both in terms of storage 
capacity and speed. If we can start to unravel 
the complexities of the cognitive map, and 
determine its structure the implicit argument 
is we can design better GIS databases. The proto- 
type systems mentioned above are merely 
scratching the surface of a potential revolution 
in how computers may be designed and used in the 
future. 
Other Applied Uses 
David Canter has used cognitive mapping theory in 
tracking down criminals for the police (Canter & 
Larkin, 1993; Canter & Gregory, in press, Bouquet, 
1994). He suggests that criminals' cognitive maps 
shape and constrain the criminal and non-criminal 
spatial activity of any offender (Canter & Gregory, 
in press). First-time offenders commit crimes in 
areas where they have good cognitive maps, usually 
their local neighbourhood and as they get more 
experienced they will stray further afield. Because 
criminals on the whole are domicentric (reside in 
one location) and value familiarity with an area 
over the risks of being recognized (although there 
is a minimum distance of travel), by plotting the 
sites of the attacks their home location can be 
determined (91% of criminals had circular ranges) 
(Canter & Larkin, 1993). Using this as a basis 
coupled with a criminal profile, a rapist and 
murderer, John Duffy, was tracked down to 
Cricklewood, in north-west London. 
Another possibility for an applied use, may be in 
search and rescue operations. Certain cognitive 
mapping characteristics could in theory be profiled 
onto victims who are lost, through the descriptions 
of relatives and friends. This may give a detailed 
portrait of the victim revealing how they might 
behave, what type of strategy they are likely to use 
in trying to find their way again, and even how far 
they might have strayed. This may make the 
searchers job easier by suggesting where might be 
an appropriate place to look for the victim, rather 
than conducting large random or systematic searches. 
Conc lus ion  
This paper has broadly outlined what cognitive 
maps and mapping are, the reasons for misunder- 
standings and their theoretical and applied worth. 
It has been demonstrated that cognitive mapping has 
a role to play in spatial behaviour, spatial decision 
making, learning and acquisition theory making and 
in real world applications, uch as planning, teaching, 
map making and computer interfaces and data- 
bases. What should be made clear though is that 
conceptual research is considerably more developed 
and actively practised than applied research. There 
are three main reasons for this (see Table 5). 
In an age where it is increasingly difficult to 
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TABLE 5 
Reasons for more conceptual research 
1 The (seemingly) lack of potential clients (Lynch 1976). 
2 Little attempt o put conclusions into guidelines 
accessible topotential users (Siedel 1985). 
3 Very few specific direct pieces of applied work in the 
past (Moore 1979). 
attract grants and funding (especially in the U.K.) 
for cognitive mapping research to develop and take 
place, it has to attempt to practise applied research, 
formulate guidelines, and attract and make poten- 
tial clients. This paper aimed to highlight he many 
current and potential applications, to justify cogni- 
tive mapping research, and to encourage more mul- 
tidisciplinary research, especially that of an applied 
nature. The way forward in cognitive mapping 
is further integration of conceptual research and 
continued diversification and practice of applied 
research. 
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